We suggest twenty immediately actionable steps to reduce widespread inferential errors related 2 to "statistical significance testing." Our propositions refer first to the theoretical preconditions for using p-3 values. They furthermore include wording guidelines as well as structural and operative advice on how to 4 present results, especially in multiple regression analysis. Our propositions aim at fostering the logical 5 consistency of inferential arguments by avoiding false categorical reasoning. They are not aimed at dis-6 pensing with p-values or completely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics. 7
Introduction 9
One might think, enough has been said about the misuses and misinterpretations of the p-value, both be-10 fore and after the ASA-statement (WASSERSTEIN and LAZAR 2016) . But the problems seem to be here to 11 stay. Two related features of the frequentist null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) framework are at 12 the origin of most errors: first, the dichotomization of results depending on whether the p-value is below 13 or above some arbitrary threshold (usually 0.05). Second, the associated terminology that speaks of "hy-14 pothesis testing" and "statistically significant" as opposed to "statistically non-significant" results. Di-15 chotomization in conjunction with misleading terminology have propagated cognitive biases that seduce 16 even experienced researchers to make logically inconsistent and overconfident inferences, both when p is 17 below and when it is above the conventional "significance" threshold. The following errors seem to be 18 particularly widespread: 1 19 1) use of p-values when there is neither a random sample nor a treatment after random assignment 20 2) confusion of statistical and practical significance or complete neglect of effect size 21
3) unwarranted binary statements of there being an effect as opposed to no effect, coming along with 22 -misinterpretations of p-values below 0.05 as posterior probabilities of the null hypothesis 23 -mixing up of testing and estimating and misinterpretation of "significant" results as evidence in fa-24 vor of the coefficients/effect sizes estimated from a single sample 25 -treatment of effects that are "statistically non-significant" as being zero (confirmation of the null) 26 4) inflation of evidence against the null caused by p-hacking or unconsidered multiple comparisons 27 5) inflation of effect sizes caused by considering "significant" results only 28
The ASA-statement has highlighted that the p-value does not provide a good measure of evidence regard-1 ing a hypothesis. It is nonetheless a continuous measure of the strength of evidence against the null hy-2 pothesis, but only in the sense that small p-values will occur more often if there is an effect compared to 3 no effect (HIRSCHAUER et al. 2017 lieve that degrading the p-value's continuous message into binary "significance" declarations ("bright line 6 rules") is at the heart of the problem. Since the p-value is so deeply anchored in the minds of most applied 7 researchers, we believe that demanding drastic procedural changes, such as renouncing p-values or com-8 pletely replacing frequentist approaches by Bayesian statistics, is not the most promising approach for 9 mitigating the serious inferential errors that we see today. Dispensing with the dichotomy of significance 10 testing but retaining the p-value and adopting small and manageable but efficient steps towards improve-11 ment seems to be more promising (AMRHEIN et al. 2017) . Adequate steps will have to take account of the 12 idiosyncrasies of each scientific discipline. For example, requirements in the biomedical sciences, which 13 often focus on risk ratios or mean differences between experimental treatments, will at least partly differ 14 from those in the social sciences including economics, which frequently resort to multiple regression anal- 15 ysis of observational data. In this paper, we compile a promising list of such steps with a focus on the use 16 of p-values in multiple regression analysis. 17 
Things to consider in general 18
Even if one is fully aware of the fundamental pitfalls of NHST, it is difficult to escape the categorical rea -19 soning that is so entrancingly suggested by its dichotomous "significance" declarations. 2 It is an even 20 more difficult task to provide readers with an interpretative evaluation of the often large numbers of coef-21 ficient estimates in multiple regressions that avoids inferential errors. Imagine a regression with several 22 focal variables (predictors), a set of controls, and possibly even some secondary covariates (interaction 23 terms, higher-order polynomials, etc.) introduced in the process of model specification. How should we 24 evaluate and comment on the "evidence" as represented in the large number of regression coefficient es-25 timates and their associated p-values? We know that we should dispense with the extremely convenient 26 2 Misunderstandings are exacerbated by the fact that few users of NHST seem to be familiar with the details of the differing perspectives adopted by FISHER (1925) and NEYMAN and PEARSON (1933) that have been amalgamated into what is today known as NHST (see, e.g., ZILIAK and MCCLOSKEY 2008). In statistical decision theory inherited from Neyman and Pearson, the "world" (formally, the parameter space) is indeed divided into two mutually exclusive states -represented by null and the alternative hypothesis -between which a decision has to be made. The dichotomous setting results from assuming a 0/1 loss function and from constructing optimal decision rules that minimize the expected loss of a false decision (e.g., LEHMANN and ROMANO 2010: 56ff.). While Fisher argued that "significance testing" is a tool for inductive reasoning, statistical decision theory in the Neyman-Pearson tradition rejects this idea. Instead, it uses "hypothesis testing" to identify rules of behavior, which "insure that in the long run of experience, we shall not be too often wrong" (NEYMAN and PEARSON 1933: 291) . It seems that the assumptions of statistical decision theory rarely apply to empirical research based on multiple regression analysis whose regular objective is to investigate (causal) relationships (coefficients, effect sizes) that link one or more "predictor" variables with a "response" variable. The "inductive belief" in the predictors being non-zero is more appropriately reflected by a gradual indicator than by a 0/1 decision setting. but misleading dichotomous interpretation. This creates a big problem, however. Despite hundreds or even 1 thousands of papers criticizing the misuses and misinterpretations of the p-value (the don'ts), we still lack 2 appropriate wordings that describe the informational content of a p-value correctly and meaningfully. This 3 is because the p-value does not provide a clear rationale or even calculus for statistical inference 4 (GOODMAN 2008), or, as BERRY (2017: 896) formulates more drastically, because "as such it has no in-5 ferential content." 6
Our wording difficulties are due to the obscure as well as noisy and inconclusive informational content of 7 the p-value that as such even precludes making probability statements about hypotheses (GELMAN 2016). 8
On the one hand, we know that for a two-sided test "any p-value less than 1 implies that the test [null] 9 hypothesis is not the hypothesis most compatible with the data, because any other hypothesis with a larger 10 p-value would be even more compatible with the data" (GREENLAND et al. 2016: 341) . Along the same 11 lines but with a focus on experimental data, GOODMAN (2008: 136) notes that "the effect best supported 12 by the data from a given experiment is always the observed effect, regardless of its significance." On the 13 other hand, while realizing that there is evidence in the data, we commonly interpret the p-value as a first 14 defense line against being fooled by the randomness of sampling (BENJAMINI 2016) when generalizing 15 from our findings to the population. We should meet this defense-line interpretation with caution, howev-16 er, because the p-value itself is but a noisy statistic of data obtained from one-time random sampling. In 17 plausible constellations of noise and sample size, the p-value exhibits wide sample-to-sample variability 18 (HALSEY et al. 2015) . This is paralleled by the variability of estimated coefficients over replications. We 19 may easily find a large coefficient in one random sample (overestimation) and a small one in another (un-20 derestimation). We must not forget that unbiased estimators estimate correctly on average (HIRSCHAUER 21 et al. 2017). We would thence need all estimates from frequent replications -irrespective of their p-value 22 and their being large or small -to obtain a good idea of the population effect size. Based on a single sam-23 ple, we have no way of identifying the p-value below (above) which the associated effect size estimate is 24 too large (too small), but we are very likely to overestimate effect sizes when taking "significant" results 25 at face value (HIRSCHAUER et al. 2017) . Even when finding a highly "significant" result (with, let's say, a 26 p-value of 0.001), which ironically would be a highly appreciated case in the conventional NHST-27 approach, we cannot make a direct inference and assume the estimated effect to accurately reflect the pop-28 ulation effect size (BANCROFT 1944 3 Hence, even seemingly neutral, non-31 dichotomous representations such as "the retail prices of product A exceed the retail prices of product B 32 by 20% on average (p < 0.001)" may be misleading because they insinuate that the evidence against the 33 null can be translated into evidence in favor of the concrete effect that we happened to find in a single 34 sample (AMRHEIN et al 2017) . 35 The problem of interpreting p-values is further exacerbated by the fact that multiple comparisons, which 1 are inherent to multiple regression, inflate the strength of evidence against the null as indicated by the p-2 value. Since the extent of multiple comparisons varies between studies, p-values cannot be compared 3 across different studies. A p-value is a summary statistic that tells us how incompatible the data are with 4 the specified statistical model including the null hypothesis. In a single regression, a p-value (for example 5 0.05) represents the conditional probability of finding the observed effect (or even a larger one) in random 6
replications if the null hypothesis were true. In contrast, in a multiple regression with, let's say, ten focal 7 predictor variables, we make ten comparisons in that we assess the strength of evidence against the null as 8 many times as there are variables of interest. Even if all ten null hypotheses were true, we would have a 9
40.1% (1-0.95 10 ) probability of finding at least one coefficient with p ≤ 0.05. Finding a low p-value for a 10 coefficient in a multiple regression represents much weaker evidence against the null than finding the 11 same p-value in a single regression. While obfuscating the dividing line between confirmatory and explor-12 atory research (see suggestion 9, 11, and 15), we must furthermore not forget that applied researchers 13 commonly retain one model as the final ("best") model after different models have been tried out and 14 evaluated by using some measure of model fit (e.g., likelihood ratio or Akaike Information Criterion). We 15 necessarily produce inflated effects and arrive at overconfident conclusions if we assess the strength of 16 evidence in only the "best" model even though multiple alternatives had been tried out before (DANILOV 17 and MAGNUS 2004; FORSTMEIER et al. 2016) . 18
Remembering that the p-value is but a summary statistic of the data at hand is important because we must 19 avoid all wordings that invite confusion with the posterior (or Bayesian) probability, i.e., the epistemic 20 probability that a hypothesis or scientific proposition about the world is true given the evidence from the 21 data. There is a big tension between the correctness and the intuitive meaningfulness of the p-value inter-22 pretation as people, especially when confronted with "significance" language, seem to be prone to the 23 "inverse probability error." That is, they often confuse the "conditional probability of data given a hypoth-24 esis" (p-value) with the "conditional probability of a hypothesis given the data" (posterior probability). 25 "Inverse probability error" is a term coined by COHEN (1994: 997) to emphasize that the p-value "does not 26 tell us what we want to know [i.e., the posterior probability], and [that] we so much want to know what we 27 want to know that out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does." is not so much due to researchers not recognizing the problems associated with conventional significance 35
testing, but rather due to their not knowing what to do instead. With a view to the apparent need for both 36 guidance and (at least some degree of) consensus among scientists, this commentary discusses and sug-1 gests immediate reforms that seem to be realistic in the light of the p-value's deep entrenchment in current 2 research practice. 3
We systematically compile suggestions (do's) -none of them new and none of them our own -that jointly 4 seem to represent the most promising set of concrete and immediately actionable steps. 4 Being econo-5 mists, we focus on suggestions that are relevant for correctly interpreting the results of multiple regression 6 analysis, which is the working horse in econometric research. Being pragmatic, we focus on suggestions 7 that are concerned with the analysis of single-sample data, even though we are aware of the advantages of 8 multiple-study designs, meta-analysis, and Bayesian approaches for making valid inferences. In brief, the 9 criteria for the selection of suggestions were as follows: (i) their suitability for furthering a correct and 10 meaningful interpretation of p-values associated with regression coefficient estimates in single studies; 11
(ii) their capacity to provide small and efficient changes that are manageable for all those who are so 12 much accustomed to using p-values that they are probably not ready (yet) to meet the huge challenges of 13 fully Bayesian analyses within a multiple regression framework. 14 Contenting ourselves for the time being with compiling small incremental steps for single-study designs 15 must not be understood as opposition towards more substantial change in the future. Quite on the contrary. 16 We hope that our suggestions will help prepare the field for better study designs and inferential tools, and 17 especially more pre-registration, replication, and meta-analytical thinking in the long run. More immedi-18 ately, however, we hope that they will serve as a discussion base or even tool kit that is directly helpful, 19
for example, to editors of (economic) journals who reflect on best practices and try to revise their editorial 20 policies and guidelines in order to increase the quality of published research. In brief, we address the ques-21 tion of how a typical econometric study, which for the time being refrains from Bayesian statistics and 22 continues to use p-values, should proceed and which wordings it should use to avoid the many inferential 23 errors that are so pervasive at present. It is important to note that some suggestions, such as displaying 24 random errors, could be criticized as asking for redundant information. Readers of a research paper could 25 in principle compute standard errors when effect sizes and p-values are provided. Mathematical redundan-26 cy is not a good argument, however. Instead, the question is how we should present information to avoid 27 cognitive biases and foster the logical consistency of inferential arguments through good intuition. research not employing random assignment or random sampling, the classical approach to inferential sta-31 tistics is inappropriate. […] In the case of a random sample, the p-value addresses the following question: 32
'If the null hypothesis were true of the population, how likely would we have been to obtain a sample 33 statistic this large or larger in a sample of this size?' […] In the case of random assignment, the p-value 1 targets the following question: 'If the null hypothesis were true about the difference between treated and 2 untreated groups, how likely is it that we would have obtained a difference between them this big (or big-3 ger) when studying treatment and comparison groups of this size?' […] If the experimental and control 4 groups have not been assigned using probability techniques, or if the cases have not been sampled from a 5 population using probability methods, inferential statistics are not applicable. They are routinely applied in 6 inapplicable situations, but an error is no less erroneous for being widespread." 7 random sample that you have chosen for convenience reasons instead of using probability methods. Being 13 inherently based on probability theory and repeated random sampling, displaying p-values for a non-random 14 sample is meaningless and no help whatsoever for making statistical inferences. 15 Suggestion 2: When using p-values as an inferential aid in studies based on random sampling or random 16 assignment, be clear that the function of the p-value is different in the two cases. In the random sample 17 case, you are concerned with generalizing from the sample to the population. In the random assignment 18 case, you are concerned with the internal validity of an experiment in which you randomly assign experi-19 mental subjects to groups that you subject to different treatments. For random assignments, the p-value is 20 a continuous measure of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis of there being no treatment 21 effect in the experiment. It is no help whatsoever to assess the generalizability of results towards the popu-22 lation from which the experimental subjects themselves have been recruited. They may, or may not, be a 23 random sample of a certain population. 24
Suggestion 3: Be aware that random samples from a population are often costly to come by and therefore 25 frequently not available. When using p-values as a tool that is to help generalize from a sample to a popu-26 lation, provide convincing arguments that your sample represents at least approximately a random sample. 27
To avoid misunderstandings, transparently state how and from which population the random sample was 28 drawn and to which population you want to generalize. 5 29 5 Emphasizing the p-value's probabilistic foundation, DENTON (1988: 166f.) points out that "where there is a sample there must be a population." He notes that conceiving of the population can be difficult. The easiest case is a sample drawn from a finite population such as a country's citizens. A less intuitive sample-population relationship arises when we generate a sample by conducting an experiment such as flipping a coin n-times. Here, the population is an imaginary set of infinitely repeated coin flips. When studying observational macro-data, maintaining the p-value's probabilistic foundation poses serious conceptual challenges. One would have to imagine an "unseen parent population" and a noisy generating process from which we observe a random realization.
(b)
strength of evidence against the null. Make sure that the reader realizes that no particular information is 3 associated with a p-value being either below or above some particular threshold such as 0.05 (see also 4 suggestion 19). 6 
5
Suggestion 5: Avoid wordings that insinuate that the p-value denotes an epistemic (posterior) probability 6 that you can attach to a scientific hypothesis (the null) given the evidence you found in your data. Stating 7 that you found an effect with an error probability of p is misleading, for example. It suggests the false 8 interpretation that the p-value is the probability of the null -and therefore the probability of being wrong 9
("in error") when rejecting it. Consequently, avoid the term "error probability." 10 Suggestion 6: Avoid wordings that insinuate that a low p-value indicates a large or even practically or 11 economically relevant size of the estimate, and vice versa. Use wordings such as "large" or "relevant" but 12 refrain from using "significant" when discussing the effect size -at least as long as threshold thinking and 13 dichotomous interpretations of p-values associated with the term "statistical significance" linger on in the 14 scientific community (see also suggestion 19). 15
Suggestion 7: Do not suggest that high p-values can be interpreted as an indication of no effect ("evidence 16 of absence") even though in the NHST-approach "non-significance" leads to non-rejection of the null 17 hypothesis of no effect. Do not even suggest that high p-values can be interpreted as "absence of evi-18 dence." Doing so would negate the evident effects that you observed in the data. "statistically significant effect of z" should be avoided, for example, because they mix up estimating and 22 testing procedures. The strength of evidence against the null cannot directly be translated into evidence in 23 favor of the concrete estimate that one happened to find in a sample. 24
Suggestion 9: Do not use neither the term "hypothesis testing" nor the term "confirmatory analysis." It is 25 logically impossible to infer from the p-value whether the null hypothesis or an alternative hypothesis is 26 true. We cannot even derive probabilities for hypotheses based on what has delusively become known as 27 "hypothesis testing." p-values cannot "test" or "confirm" any hypothesis at all, but only describe data fre-28 quencies under a certain statistical model including the null hypothesis. 6 This is different from statistical decision theory where, based on restrictive assumptions, a dichotomous "p < 0.05-decision" would be not only conventional but optimal. We deliberately focus on an alternative perspective here, which is driven from the problems experienced in the practice of multiple regression analysis. 7 In specification search, researchers try to identify a model that reasonably fits the data, i.e., decisions are to be made between competing models. Doing so, researchers often resort to statistical tests based on "hypothesis testing" routines resting upon conventional p-value thresholds. Despite this label, the p-value in statistical tests is not an epistemic probability of one model being "better" than another. Instead, these routines reflect conventional decision-rules of when the null hypothesis, which is usually used to represent the more convenient simple model such as one based
(c) Things to do and discuss explicitly 4
Suggestion 11: Do explicitly state whether your study is exploratory and thus aimed at generating new 5 research questions/hypotheses, or whether it is aimed at producing new evidence with regard to pre-6 specified research questions/hypotheses. While the latter is conventionally termed "confirmatory analy-7
sis," this term should be avoided. It might mislead people to expect categorical yes/no answers that we 8 cannot give (see suggestion 9). Your paper may also contain both types of analysis. If so, explicitly com-9 municate where you change from the study of pre-specified issues to exploratory search. 10 Suggestion 12: In the exploratory search for potentially interesting associations, large effect sizes in con-11 junction with low p-values may be useful as a flagging device to identify what might be worth investigat-12 ing with new data in the future. To prevent overhasty generalizations from such an unconstrained "search 13
for discoveries" in a single sample, it might be worthwhile considering BERRY'S (2017: 897) recommen-14 dation to use the following warning: "Our study is exploratory and we make no claims for generalizability. 15
Statistical calculations such as p-values and confidence intervals are descriptive only and have no inferen-16 tial content." 17
Suggestion 13: If your study is aimed at producing evidence regarding pre-specified research ques-18 tions/hypotheses, exactly report in your paper the list of questions/hypotheses that you drafted as well as 19 the (econometric) model you specified regarding structure and variable set before seeing the data. In the 20 results section, clearly relate findings to the initial questions or hypotheses. 21 Suggestion 14: When studying pre-specified questions or hypotheses, clearly distinguish two parts in your 22 analysis: (i) the description of the evidence (estimates) that you actually happened to find in your single 23 study (What is the evidence in this data?); (ii) the inferential reasoning that you base on this evidence 24 under consideration of p-values, confidence intervals, the study design, and all relevant external evidence 25 (What should one reasonably believe after seeing this data?). If applicable, a third part should outline the 26 recommendations or decisions that you would make all things considered including the weights attributed 27 to type I and type II errors (What should one do after seeing this data?). 28
Suggestion 15:
If you specify/adapt your initial model contingent on the data even though you aim to 29 carry out a study concerned with pre-specified hypotheses, explicitly justify that your data-contingent 30 model specification does not constitute "hypothesizing after the results are known." When making infer-31 ences, explicitly consider and comment on multiple comparisons that inflate the strength of the evidence 32 against the null as indicated by the p-value. Doing so, distinguish between (i) the multiple comparisons 33 on a normal distribution assumption, should be rejected in favor of a more complex model. These decision-rules are based on arbitrary weights that are assigned to type I and -implicitly -type II errors.
that you make because you study multiple variables in your final regression model, and (ii) the multiple 1 comparisons that you make if you tried multiple models before retaining one model as the "best" model. If 2 appropriate, use robustness checks to show how substantially stable ("robust") your findings are over a 3 reasonable range of analytical variants. 4
Suggestion 16:
In inferential reasoning, explicitly distinguish between statistical and scientific inference. 5
Statistical inference and the p-value are concerned with the random sampling error, i.e., the fact that even 6 a random sample will not exactly reflect the properties of the population. Generalizing from a random 7 sample to its population is only the first step of scientific inference, which is the totality of reasoned judg-8 ments (inductive generalizations) that we make in the light of our own study and the available body of 9 external evidence. We might want to know, for example, what we can learn from a random sample of a 10 country's agricultural students for its student population, its citizens, or even human beings in general. Be 11 clear in your inferential reasoning that a p-value, being a probabilistic concept, can do nothing to assess 12 the generalizability of results beyond the parent population (here: the country's agricultural students) from 13 which the random sample has been drawn. 14 dence against the null is useful for making inferences despite the unknown but often wide sample-to-22 sample variability of p-values. However, do not classify results as being "statistically significant" or not. 23 That said, avoid using the terms "statistically significant" and "statistically non-significant" altogether. 24
Dispensing with these two categorical labels enables you for the first time to use "relevant" and "signifi-25 cant" as interchangeable terms without causing confusion. We hope that we give an impulse to applied researchers to comply with these single-study suggestions in 30 all cases in which coordinated multiple-study designs are not feasible. We furthermore believe that the 31 quality of published research could be improved by incorporating these suggestions as best practice rules 32 into journal guidelines. With a view to the inflation of the strength of evidence through covert multiple 1 comparisons (p-hacking), SIMMONS et al. (2012) propose a formalization outside of the paper that seems 2 worthwhile considering. Similar to the standard "no-competing-interests" statements, they suggest to 3 oblige authors to make a formal "no-p-hacking" declaration. The problem is that it is difficult to unambig-4 uously define the practices that are outlawed as p-hacking. A substantiated selection of an analytical ap-5 proach is not p-hacking. But results will be biased if researchers covertly engage in multiple comparisons 6 and selectively publish only the analytical variant that "worked" in that it produced lower p-values than 7 other variants (HIRSCHAUER et al. 2016 ). For a formal declaration to make sense, journals must clearly 8 specify outlawed practices. Some people may think that, given the perverse publish-or-perish conditions 9 that many researchers face today, a formal no-p-hacking declaration is just an empty phrase. However, we 10 believe that it could produce a practically significant reinvigoration of science ethics' call for transparency 11 and integrity that leads to published research better reflecting reality than what we have seen in the past. 
to Berry, we believe that we should only dispense with the dichotomy of significance testing and categori-3 cal reasoning but retain the p-value itself because of its familiarity and potential usefulness. However, if 4 retaining the p-value is to make sense, we need practical guidance for applied researchers who, rightly 5 leaving behind dichotomous significance declarations, are in need of correct and understandable formula -6 tions of what a p-value means. Debate and consensus on such guidance could possibly be brought about 7 through organized approaches and concerted actions of statistical associations and the professional associ-8 ations and journals in the various disciplines. 9
A second and analogous problem arises because it is equally hard to provide a correct wording and good 10 intuition regarding the meaning of the confidence interval (CI). Imagine observing a mean difference of 11 10 g in daily weight gains between two randomly assigned animal groups that were subjected to different 12 dietary treatments. Finding a 95% CI of [8, 12] , it would not be correct to say that the difference is be-13 tween 8 g and 12 g with 95% probability. Not much change for the better is obtained by replacing "proba-14 ble" with words such as "likely/plausible" or "confident." Stating, for example, that the CI indicates the 15 precision of the estimation and that "in other words, we can be 95% confident that the difference is be-16 tween 8 g and 12 g" is extremely deceptive. This holds even though researchers could argue that they use 17 the word "confidence" as a technical term that by convention is attached to the said interval. Even though 18 such statements sound like uncertainty statements, they promise too much certainty. In the words of 19 GELMAN (2016), they are to be qualified as "uncertainty laundering" because they neglect the inherent 20 uncertainty of the CI itself. A correct interpretation requires realizing that CI (analogous to p-values) are 21 noisy and vary from one random sample to the other. A 95% CI only means that 95% of CI computed for 22 repeatedly drawn random samples will capture the "true" value (GREENLAND et al. 2016). As in the case 23 of p-values, we must realize that providing a correct technical definition of a difficult-to-understand con-24 cept is not enough. It is likely to provoke an unending sequence of false "in-other-words statements." In 25 fact, we rarely see a proper and understandable interpretation of CI in empirical papers and even text-26 books. Most formulations seem to communicate in one or the other way that a CI describes the probability 27 that the specified range contains the "true" value with the stated probability (e.g., 95%). They thus insinu-28 ate that we could make an epistemic probability statement regarding the population effect size based on 29 the results of a single study. Such a statement must be reserved to Bayesian analysis (here: the Bayesian 30 posterior probability interval), however. The lack of appropriate wordings is especially serious since CI 31 have been recommended as being a part of the solution for the p-value problem (e.g., CUMMING 2014). 32
But to be a part of the solution, we first need guidance and consensus regarding the wordings that are able 33 to communicate the informational content of a CI not only correctly but also meaningfully. Again, the 34 problem that is not restricted to a particular applied science discipline, and the process of finding a solu-35 tion is likely to benefit from concerted actions of expert statisticians and the professional associations in 36 the various disciplines. 37 The fact that some of the leading journals have initiated modest but sensible changes with regard to the 34 use of the p-value is a promising signal. GOODMAN (2017: 559) notes that "norms are established within 35 communities partly through methodological mimicry." If a field's flagship journals, opinion leaders, andprofessional associations take up the lead, they may be able to set a trend. "Once the process starts, it 1 could be self-enforcing. Scientists will follow practices they see in publications; peer reviewers will de-2 mand what other reviewers demand of them." Besides their general function as beacons for best practice, 3 the guidelines of flagship journals may become more direct agents of change due to prevalent submission 4 practices. Researchers often submit their papers to leading journals first. If declined, they regularly try 5 alternative publication outlets and submit their papers, written according to the guidelines of the flagship 6 journal, more or less unchanged to less prominent journals. This might cause a trickle-down effect that 7
generates new best practice standards for the less prominent journal. 8
Measures beyond the single study 9
Avoiding mistakes within the single study is a necessary but not sufficient condition for making correct 10 inferences. Instead, we need to embed each study in its wider context and consider the body of evidence 11 including all external ("prior") knowledge in the field under research. Several propositions towards im-12 provement beyond the realms of the single study have been made. Meta-analysis that systematically con-13 solidates the body of evidence and the formal consideration of prior knowledge through Bayesian analysis 14 are prominent examples. Furthermore, two reforms on the level of scientific institutions (journals, scien-15 tific associations) are practically important in some disciplines but only nascent or non-existing in others. 16 First, many leading journals now oblige authors to provide their raw data and analytical protocols in the 17 appendix of their paper to facilitate replication studies aimed at scrutinizing a study's findings. While 18 compulsory sharing of raw data and analytical protocols seems to slowly trickle down to more and more 19 journals, institutionalized efforts to strengthen replication are weak in economics compared to other fields. A second important reform on the institutional level is pre-registration. Pre-registration goes not only 28 beyond the post-study provision of raw data and analytical protocols but also beyond the mere appeal to 29 honestly report pre-specified hypotheses and analysis plans in the paper. Instead, it obliges researchers to 30 disclose their hypotheses, data, and analytical approach before running the analysis. Analyses that deviate 31 from the pre-analysis plan must be justified and explained in the final paper. Pre-registration is aimed at 32 preventing p-hacking and providing equal chances of being published independent of which results are 33 eventually found. In other words, it is to prevent not only selective reporting but also selective publishing 34 and thus the bias towards "statistically significant" findings (cf., ROSENTHAL 1979), which seems to be 35 widespread even in economic flagship journals (BRODEUR et al. 2016). Contrary to clinical drug trials forwhich pre-registration is standard (http://www.who.int/ictrp/network/primary/en/), it is still rare in the 1 social sciences. There are, however, two new initiatives. Within the "$1 Million Preregistration Chal-2 lenge," the Center for Open Science (https://cos.io/prereg/) provides $1,000 to 1,000 researchers who pre-3 register their research projects. Because existing registries were not considered a good fit for the needs of 4 the social sciences, the American Economic Association launched an initiative in 2017 to register random-5 ized controlled trials on its AEA RCT platform (https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/). After peer-6 approval of the study design and analysis plan, research projects are accepted and published before they 7 are implemented. 8
The poor development of replication, pre-registration, and meta-analysis in economics stems from the 9 discipline's culture and its preoccupation with observational study, data-driven model specification, and 10 multiple regression analysis. In other words, there are questions to be answered before approaches from 11 other fields can be transplanted to (non-experimental) economic research. It is not clear, for example, how 12 replication or preregistration should work within a disciplinary culture in which it is not only common but 13 also highly appreciated practice to specify regression models after seeing the data ("model fitting"). ed to that, the question arises of how to carry out quantitative meta-analysis and consolidate the body of 15 evidence when even within a narrow field of research there are often as many data-dependent model spec-16 ifications as studies. The fact that economic research is mainly a bottom-up research exercise is responsi-17 ble for the lacking comparability across studies. Non-programmed bottom-up research produces a large 18 quantity of empirical results on topical issues, but is plagued by an enormous heterogeneity of empirical 19 measures and model specifications. Besides differing measures for the focal variables of interest, 20 databased models are regularly populated by differing interaction terms, transformed variables, lagged 21 variables, higher-order polynomials, and control variables. Given the heterogeneity of econometric mod-22 els, applied economists need guidance and consensus regarding best practices for specification search, 23 replication, and meta-analysis. We hope that professional associations in the field of economics take up 24 the cause and organize a debate on the urging question of how to systematically build up knowledge and 25 scrutinize scientific claims derived from nearly limitless variants of databased models. 26
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